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ABSTRACT
The recent debate over “republican” conceptions of freedom as non-domination has re-
invigorated philosophical discussions of freedom. However, “neo-Roman” republican-
ism, which has been characterized as republicanism that respects equality, has largely
ignored the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, although he too took his task to be crafting
a republicanism suited to equality. I therefore provide a philosophical treatment of the
heart of Tocqueville’s republicanism, including an analysis of his conception of freedom
as freedom in combined action and a philosophical reconstruction of his primary argu-
ment for the importance of this kind of freedom. A comparison of Philip Pettit’s and
Tocqueville’s republicanism exposes limitations in the neo-Roman conception of free-
dom as non-domination and its ideal of the free citizen and shows why neo-Roman re-
publicanism, to live up to its motivating ideals, should accommodate elements of “neo-
Athenian” republicanism and freedom in combined action.
“What is man that thou art mindful of him?” . . . The whole political, social, and
economic structure of any society is largely determined by its answer to this pressing
question . . . whether man is a cog in the wheel of the state or whether he is a free
creative being capable of facing responsibility. (King 1959/2001, 9)
1. THE NEW REPUBLICANISM:
FREEDOM AND EQUALITY
Recent philosophical discussions of liberty have been enriched and reinvigo-
rated by the reappearance of “republican” conceptions of freedom in the work
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of historians such as Quentin Skinner and philosophers such as Philip Pettit.
Freedom so understood consists not in the absence of interference, constraints,
or coercion, but instead in the absence of domination.
The classical republican tradition is rooted in a set of texts that elucidate
and defend republican ideas and ideals (by authors such as Cicero, Polybius,
Livy, the Machiavelli of The Discourses, Harrington, Milton, Sidney, etc.), as
well as a series of historical regimes in which republican ideals are to a partial
but signiﬁcant extent embodied (such as the Roman Republic, the Florentine
and Venetian city-states, the Dutch Republic, the English Commonwealth, the
American Republic, and so on; Pettit 2012, 6–7). What Skinner and Pettit claim
sets the new republicanism apart from the classical variety is a commitment to
equality; their version aims to provide liberty for all individuals within a state
equally rather than seeking to guarantee it for some limited class of individu-
als, and on this basis it stakes its claim to renewed attention.1
Part of the reason for the new republicanism’s appeal is the promise of relief
from the now rather shopworn debates over “negative” and “positive” free-
dom (see esp. Berlin 1958/2002; MacCallum 1967). Negative freedom—free-
dom from interference, coercion, and so on—has come to seem too dull, too
philistine, or possessed of too limited applicability; positive freedom, on the
other hand, perhaps spelled out as self-mastery or the achievement of the hu-
man essence in community with others, has come to seem too fraught with
metaphysical or totalitarian baggage.Within this context, the virtues of repub-
licanism stand out. The republican conception of freedom, as characterized by
Pettit, possesses an estimable ancestry within political theory, a rich historical
connection to the British and American Revolutions of 1688 and 1776, respec-
tively, and an intriguing revisionary account of the history of freedom (Pettit
1997; Skinner 2006). This has opened new lines of argument and made it pos-
sible to look at old arguments, ideas, and authors in new ways. Most impor-
tantly, it has given us new questions to ask.
As the new republicanism’s primary philosophical architect, Philip Pettit’s
main statements of the position—Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and
Government (1997) and On the People’s Terms (2012)—will here stand as
representative of the view. Ex ante, one imagines that the bold reconceptual-
ization of a central political ideal would provide a robust and original political
vision whose roots in the past prevent it from being entirely “radical” but that
1. For example, see Pettit (1997, 6): “When traditional commonwealthmen and republi-
cans hailed the ideal of freedom as non-domination, they only ever imagined that it was an
ideal for an elite of propertied, mainstream males. . . . But there is every reason why we
should reappropriate their ideal and reintroduce it as a universal ideal for the members of
a contemporary society.”
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nonetheless poses signiﬁcant challenges for the politics of today; we assume
that bringing new questions to the fore and upsetting one of the age’s shared
assumptions should yield a politics to some signiﬁcant degree independent of
our common ways of thinking about politics.2 Yet the new republicanism, sur-
prisingly, does not give birth to anything new; instead, Pettit reassures us that,
although it may suggest reforms to our political institutions and practices, the
republican conception of freedom will not shake existing left-liberal convic-
tions.3 What republicanism offers is not novelty but a “rival axiomization of
many [left-liberal] institutions” (Pettit 1997, 12) and a resulting greater concep-
tual simplicity and unity.
The newmovement is often termed “neo-Roman” by its proponents, to em-
phasize that it is more concerned with non-domination than with democratic
participation, in contrast to “neo-Athenian” theorists such as Hannah Arendt.
Democratic participation is treated as an instrumental good to non-domination
instead, and this, it is argued, is also what set apart Rome from Athens. But
unlike Rome, the new republicanism maintains a self-conscious commitment
to equality conjoined with the commitment to republican liberty; a republican
constitution should contain no distinction between liber and servus. Is this move
so powerful that it changes republicanism into something not too different from
modern liberalism as represented by Berlin, which combines a commitment to
negative freedom with a commitment to equality?4
To explore this question, we need two things: a standard of some kind for
what republicanism is, and, if possible, a rival derivation of republicanism-cum-
equality to help us see what might be missing from or surreptitiously added to
the new account.
For the ﬁrst, Pettit points the way to a standard; he places great importance
on the republican picture of the free citizen, an independent citizen who proudly
looks others in the eye, who ﬂatters and kowtows to no one, and who respects
the rights of others while displaying servility to none. In Pettit’s thought this
ideal is given its fullest development in On the People’s Terms through its in-
corporation into “the eyeball test”: people “should be able to look one another
2. Pettit comes close to claiming as much in Pettit (1997, 11–12): “But though republican-
ism is organized around a modest and traditional starting-point, it is extremely fruitful and
challenging in the theorems about government institutions which it allows us to derive”;
however, he limits this challenge to institutions (not convictions). But cf. Pettit (2012, 19).
3. For example, “Left-of-centre liberals will ﬁnd the republican line advanced in this book
attractive, . . . even the broad-brush strokes offered by way of sketching possible institutional
designs should make it absolutely clear that the agenda supported by the republican argu-
ment is reformist and progressive in its implications” (Pettit 1997, 10).
4. Berlin stresses the need to balance a plurality of different values with one another, in-
cluding freedom, equality, justice, happiness, security, and public order; see Berlin (1958/
2002).
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in the eye without reason for fear or deference” (2012, 91). This test allows him
a practical method of discerning whether a relationship or institution is marked
by domination, contrary to the ideal. Regardless of this speciﬁc application, how-
ever, a certain picture of the independent citizen is central to both the new and
the old republicanism, and as an ideal it gives republicanism a particular kind
of spirit and source of appeal—namely, our conviction that this ideal portrays
an attractive and important picture of citizenship and of what it means to be-
long to a particular kind of social and political order. Call this the appeal to the
ideal of the free citizen.5
For the second part, a rival derivation of republicanism-cum-equality: if
contemporary republicanism is about combining republican liberty with equal-
ity, then it is at least as old as Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.
At many points, Tocqueville clearly conceives of himself as working within the
republican tradition, and, moreover, he explicitly announces his goal to seek
to understand how freedom can be secured under conditions of equality (see
Tocqueville 1840/2000, author’s introduction).
Oddly, Pettit provides only glancing mention of his work (see Pettit 1997, 19).
This is signiﬁcant since Tocqueville’s politics and statecraft, unlike Pettit’s, satisfy
the ex ante requirement: they have proven variously attractive and challenging
to both left and right, appealing to thinkers as diverse as Peter Lawler and Sheldon
Wolin (see esp. Lawler 1993b; Wolin 2003). Tocqueville’s conception of free-
domandhis analysis of the difﬁculties of establishing it under conditions of equality
provide a conceptual framework for politics that is orthogonal to traditional or
contemporary American and French political categories, one rich in challeng-
ing implications and surprising potential alliances. It will therefore provide our
rival derivation of republican freedom as conjoined with equality.
With our standard and our comparison now in hand, we can focus on our
main problem, restated as follows: Does the new republicanism leave something
important out of its derivation and conceptualization of republicanism—some-
thing we can see is missing from the way it develops the ideal of the free citizen?
Also, is there something else being added to the picture beyond the admittedly
new commitment to equality? Last, we might also ask, could a republicanism that
paid adequate attention to the work of Tocqueville provide a more challenging
and yet also more satisfying conception of republican politics?
5. Pettit uses “the image of the liber or ‘free person’” as “a guiding heuristic” for his the-
ory (2012, 82). Pettit lists the appeal of being able to “look others in the eyes” as among the
primary personal attractions freedom as non-domination holds for him (1997, viii). Good
examples of Pettit’s use of the appeal can be found at Pettit (1997, 5, 60, 268) and Pettit
(2012, 2–3, 17, and esp. 82–88, where the eyeball test and “free person heuristic” are formally
introduced).
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2. THE FORGOTTEN FOREBEAR
Tocqueville accepted the new republicans’ central insight, that freedom re-
quires freedom from domination and dependence, and he shared their con-
cerns about the danger of arbitrary power and its tendency to degrade the
souls of those subject to it. Like Pettit, he gives great importance to a certain
kind of pride and spirit of resistance among the citizenry; he too feels the ap-
peal of the ideal of the free citizen, and although he does not provide a single
treatment of democratic spirit that would draw together his scattered observa-
tions and treatments of the subject, Tocqueville’s thought is marked by a con-
cern with instilling such spirit in citizens (see Tocqueville 1856/1998, 171;
cf. Pettit 2012, 3). But Tocqueville never concludes that the mere absence of
domination could create such citizens, or that freedom could be reduced to
such, and he is concerned about how such a spirit of independence might op-
erate in the absence of a democratic political institution (see esp. Tocqueville
1856/1998, bk. 2, chap. 11; bk. 3, chaps. 1–3, 8).Why is this?
Republicanism’s ideal of the free citizen is an “ideal type,”6 in Weber’s
phrase, and is usually introduced through what we might term an “ideal dis-
tinction” between slave and free, whose function is to simplify the features of
social and political phenomena so as to focus attention on certain important
aspects of these phenomena, with the purpose of eliciting speciﬁc moral re-
sponses and intuitions. So too Tocqueville’s understanding can best be intro-
duced through examining his conception of aristocratic freedom and the “ideal
distinction” between the aristocrat and the peasant. According to Tocqueville,
social state determines how someone experiences his ability to act in the world,
and this “internal state of the soul is reproduced in mores” (1840/2000, 24).
Thus, the aristocratic type is powerful and free, with a lofty soul and lofty man-
ners, while the peasant experiences constant reminders of his inferiority and de-
pendence, which renders him to varying degrees both insolent and base (I treat
this more fully in Jech 2013). The reason he invokes this distinction is to intro-
duce and buttress yet another distinction, between the two aristocratic types
and the singular democratic type. This is due to his understanding that altered
social conditions create a great historical chasm between ourselves, who live in
a democratic age of equality, and previous generations, who lived in ages of
aristocratic inequality. This gap is fundamental to how he understands the task
of securing freedom, for he thinks that different social structures necessitate dif-
ferent means.
6. The use of “ideal types” in social theory precedes the work of Max Weber, but it is Weber
who is most responsible for clearly articulating their purpose and making self-conscious use
of them to clarify practices such as capitalism and bureaucracy (see Weber 1905/2010; 1946,
196–244).
554 • American Political Thought • Fall 2017
According to Tocqueville, aristocratic societies are extremely unjust but re-
markably secure from despotism. There are three main reasons he identiﬁes
for this: aristocratic societies possess a plurality of great lords with power in-
dependent of the king or sovereign; aristocratic societies combine individuals
into classes that have common interests and that facilitate common action; and
in the midst of hierarchy, aristocratic societies also have room for the free com-
bination of those who are neither lords nor bound vassals or serfs, which has
typically appeared in the towns, aiming to rival the power of the great lords.
He emphasizes the ﬁrst of these inDemocracy in America, arguing that so long
as a society possesses great lords, no single individual can completely dominate
society or do what he likes without opposition: “Aristocratic societies always
contain within them, in the midst of a great multitude of individuals who can
do nothing by themselves, a few very powerful and very wealthy citizens; each of
these can execute great undertakings by himself. In aristocratic societies men
have no need to unite because they are kept very much together” (Tocqueville
1840/2000, 480).
The action of common classes tends to receive only minor attention (Tocque-
ville 1856/1998, 171–79). The later Tocqueville, author of The Old Regime
and the Revolution, is most interested in the models of freedom and mutual
aid present in the medieval towns and parishes, which are the most fragile, but
also the most appropriate for us today (see Tocqueville 1856/1998, bk. 2, chaps. 9
and 10).
Since the most essential feature of aristocratic societies is the ﬁrst of these,
their organization into a plurality of structures of dependence and command,
their primary means of preserving freedom is to preserve the freedom of some
at the expense of the many. English freedom, insofar as it ﬂows from the Magna
Carta and the feudal barons’ opposition to the power of King John, arose from
precisely this dynamic of aristocratic societies.7 But the concrete basis of aris-
tocratic freedom is injustice. In aristocratic societies each great lord is set atop
a great involuntary association of individuals whose assistance he can immedi-
ately call upon to engage in whatever undertakings he chooses to pursue, a right
supported by coercive force.
Even societies located at the egalitarian limit of aristocratic social state,
such as Rome or Athens, provide equality only for citizens, not for the more
numerous noncitizens. This social order gives rise to and is sustained by the
aristocratic “dogma” that the basis for the division of ranks lies in human na-
ture itself, in the division of humanity into some who are naturally superior
and others who are naturally inferior (Tocqueville 1840/2000, 412–13). The
7. Tocqueville notes similar episodes, “which seem to belong to English history,” during
the earlier stages of the French Old Regime before the triumphs of absolutism and centrali-
zation (1856/1998, bk. 2, chap. 9, and 155).
What Has Athens to Do with Rome? • 555
freedom of aristocratic societies, then, depends on persistent injustice and a
false conception of human nature. In such societies there is always a small but
considerable body of individuals with the capacity to independently initiate
action and who cannot be easily cowed or oppressed. But in such a society
inequality does not just coexist with freedom; it is actually the means of se-
curing it.
Therefore, from Tocqueville’s perspective, Pettit has not begun to grapple
with the radical challenge in moving from an aristocratic freedom, where some
are made independent through the subjection of others, to democratic free-
dom, where all are to be made equally free and independent. He recognizes
that it will be difﬁcult to achieve this goal, but he does not seem to recognize,
as Tocqueville does, that the task and challenge of democratic statecraft is not
to go further than before but to make use of entirely different means for secur-
ing freedom. Seeking equality without providing new conditions for the exer-
cise of freedom can be disastrous because, asMirabeau wrote to Louis XVI, on
its own “equality facilitates the exercise of power” (Tocqueville 1856/1998,
97–98; Bronowski andMazlish 1960, 400). The efforts of those pursuing equal-
ity as an end may be exploited by those seeking to appropriate it as a means to
other ends. For this reason, when the French Revolution had ﬁnished its great
works of destruction, it left behind not a free people but “an immense central
power” without rivals within the state, easily appropriated by forces hostile to
freedom (Tocqueville 1856/1998, 98; Markell 2008, 31).
It is in view of considerations such as these that Tocqueville says, “In dem-
ocratic centuries like ours, association in all things must gradually replace the
dominant action of a few powerful individuals” (2002, 150; cf. Tocqueville
1840/2000, 9). This provides the great aim of democratic statecraft—provid-
ing the new conditions suitable to equality that will make freedom possible
through what Tocqueville calls “the art of being free,” that is, an art of free
association to replace the old practice of forcible association beneath a great
lord. Such associations may do all the things that a great lord might do in an
aristocratic society, all the great and small things that go beyond the power
of an individual to accomplish alone.
Because of historical circumstances rooted in their colonial experience, Amer-
icans tend to take this art for granted, but providing the conditions for it to be
best used is a remarkably difﬁcult task; Tocqueville, used to what had become
French customs in this regard, was astonished at the range of objects Ameri-
cans used the art of free association to achieve: “to give fêtes, to found semi-
naries, to build inns, to raise churches, to distribute books, to send missionar-
ies to the antipodes; [to] create hospitals, prisons, [and] schools,” and even, as
in the case of temperance societies, to provide a moral example (1840/2000,
489, 492).
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In terms of concrete policy and statecraft, providing the conditions of free
association requires a wide-ranging policy in favor of the means by which in-
dividuals associate with one another, consisting in providing the conditions
for popular involvement in government, in encouraging such involvement,
and in promoting civic association within society itself in similar ways. State-
craft and policy based on Tocqueville’s vision go beyond the negative role of
the state envisioned by those who favor negative freedom above all, but this
speciﬁc positive role is at odds with the role given to the state by contempo-
rary republicans like Pettit.8 A Tocquevillian platform could be generally anti-
bureaucratic, ambivalent about markets, generally favorable to labor unions
(although perhaps not all kinds or all methods of organization), widely favor-
able to local democratic organization, and so on.9
So Tocqueville’s derivation of republicanism differs from Pettit’s by posit-
ing an important distinction between the social conditions of the old republi-
canism and our own social conditions—the very social conditions in virtue of
which equality has become a viable and important ideal—and discerning a
corresponding change in how we should establish laws, institutions, and cus-
toms, especially with respect to establishing freedom. We ought naturally to
ask why this should be. Why should this change in the social landscape—in
social state, as Tocqueville puts it (best conceptualized in Zuckert 1993)—
be so important for freedom? Why should freedom be sensitive to social state?
Is this sensitivity to social state relevant to the ideal of the free citizen, or does
it come from somewhere else?
To address this, we shall have to do a little philosophical work concerning
the nature of combined action and its relationship to freedom. When we are
done with this, we shall be able to come back to the ideal of the free citizen
and ask how, and whether, Tocqueville’s thought represents a more faithful
derivation and conceptualization of republicanism-cum-equality.
3. RESPONSIBILITY FOR COMBINED ACTION
This philosophical foray will proceed in two stages. The ﬁrst of these, discussed
in this section, concerns the nature of combined action. The second, treated in
section 4, concerns the ideal of freedom associated with such action.
8. An examination of Tocqueville’s speech before the constituent assembly in 1848 gives
an indication of how different his policy might be from either “left” or “right” today; see
Tocqueville (1991, 196; abridged English translation in Tocqueville 2002, 250–51).
9. It may also be unsuitably imperial, if Tocqueville’s Algerian writings are any guide; I’ll
leave that aside, as it is not clear that this aspect is related to the core of Tocqueville’s politi-
cal thought in an important way.
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Pettit deﬁnes domination as the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary or un-
controlled basis in certain choices that someone is in a position to make (1997,
51–79, esp. 52; 2012, 26–74, esp. 26 and 58). Note, however, the word
“choices”—it gives a particular direction to his whole political theory, and to
a greater degree than one might ﬁrst suspect. Consider what kinds of things
come under the heading of choice, of the things that a person might chose to
do: someone chooses a religion, chooses to speak, chooses which clothes to
wear today, chooses to open an umbrella, chooses which route to take to work,
chooses to spendmoney on one product or service or another, and so on.When
it comes to one’s private life and one’s private interest, choice has its place, for
it is within this domain that what one chooses and what one does are most
reliably one and the same.
But the word “choice” is deceptive, even in the realm of intimate private
life, because so much action is not singular but combined. We propose or join
a combined action, but we do not choose it. Someone may choose to make or
accept a marriage proposal, but no one can choose to get married to someone,
or even to become friends with someone. And beyond private life, one ﬁnds
such actions on all sides, as Tocqueville’s list of Americans’ combined actions
makes clear—ranging from starting a chess club to testing a theory in particle
physics to making revolution.
Consider then some great and large nation or people. Among this people
there is activity of all kinds going on; many of the most important goods in
human life are achieved only through combined action, and in any people with
an ongoing and growing civilization human energies and activity in pursuit of
attaining and securing these goods will be continuously ongoing. We will see
this going on in agriculture, marriage, trade, construction, art, religion, sci-
ence, philosophy, athletics, and all kinds of human enterprise. Some of this
activity involves goods that can be achieved by individuals acting alone or in
groups of two or three intimates or acquaintances, but much of it requires the
kind of combined activity that requires individuals to act together in groups
larger or less intimate than that. Let this category of actions taken by individ-
uals in combination with others be termed combined action.
Within combined action there are several different ways that activity might
be organized, for which I introduce the following terminological distinctions:
1. Joint action: action begun and carried out through the free initiation
and free combination of individuals.
2. Collective action: action begun and carried out through the initiation
of some individual in the community utilizing local forms of self-
government after persuading other citizens to agree to pursue the
proposed goal.
558 • American Political Thought • Fall 2017
3. Legislative or executive action: action begun and carried out through
the initiation of some elected and accountable individual with the
ability to direct state power.
4. Administrative action: action begun and carried out through regular
bureaucratic administration.
This set of distinctions is not exhaustive—it lacks, for example, a way of
categorizing many of the various modes of combined action made possible un-
der aristocratic social state—and it may or may not resemble the way that
Tocqueville would have classiﬁed such actions. It should, however, serve pres-
ent purposes.
Let us examine a case of combined action that illustrates the features of
these different ways of pursuing action, beginning with the fourth category,
administrative action.
A school is built. Someone attends the school and later in life attains suc-
cess. She is grateful not only to the particular teachers who taught her but also
to whomever it was who thought to establish a school in her neighborhood.
The matter is harder to discover than she initially supposed. The school was
established in accordance with a certain rule, as determined by a particular
government ofﬁce; within the ofﬁce itself, the matter was not so much decided
as approved by a particular worker, and then by the worker’s supervisor—
though “approve” is too strong a word, since all the worker did was examine
certain demographic data, discern that a certain rule applied, and then ﬁle a
particular form, which initiated the whole process, and the worker’s supervi-
sor did no more than stamp the form as it crossed his desk, in accordance with
ordinary operating procedure. Land was bought, a building was constructed,
administrators and teachers were hired, but the grateful woman found no par-
ticular individual whom she might thank. She could not go to the foreman of
the construction crew, say, and thank him for building the school. He only did
what he was paid to do; it wasn’t his idea—he may have even thought it was a
bad idea to build the school, but what business was it of his? Likewise, the bu-
reaucrat with whom the process began did not necessarily have any intention
of building the school; he may have barely spared a thought for the suitability
of the rule in accordance to which new schools are scheduled to be built, and
may only have carried out the function of his ofﬁce, whose duties are precisely
deﬁned and spelled out, telling him to “ﬁle such-and-such a formwhenever such-
and-such conditions are met.” In such a case, a new school has been built, but it
may not be accurate to say that anyone has built it. The most one might say is
that she could be grateful toward whoever drafted the original law or rule,
though even this might be difﬁcult to pin down. Combined action as adminis-
trative action becomes the social analog of the unconscious processes of bodily
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life, and as the different components of the body act together to maintain ho-
meostasis, a telos without a corresponding active intention, so the activity of
society is pursued without anyone willing it to be so. Such are matters when
the administration of things replaces the government of men.
Perhaps, though, the case is different, falling under category 3, legislative
or executive action. Perhaps what the woman ﬁnds is that the school was built
through the initiative of a certain elected ofﬁceholder, who was mayor at the
time and, discerning the need for a new school in the area, championed build-
ing a school there and saw the matter through to completion; or one of her
state’s senators included it as a little quid pro quo in exchange for voting on
a certain bill that was made into law; or something else of the kind happened.
Or perhaps the school was built because some individual living in the com-
munity saw the need, in which case it would fall under category 2, collective
action. He thought that the area could use its own school and shared his idea
with others, gathering support in the community by proposing the idea and
gathering their support; ﬁnally, the community, through its governing body,
established the school. In either of the last two cases she knows whom to thank
and whom to attribute responsibility to for establishing the school. In cate-
gory 3 she has the particular ofﬁceholder to thank, and in category 2 she can
thank both the one who proposed the idea and those who joined with him to
accomplish it.
But perhaps it was none of these; perhaps instead some individual in the
community, who knew a thing or two about education, was unhappywith what
she found and disapproved of the kind of education her child was getting in the
existing schools. She disagreed with their educational philosophy or disliked
the crowded conditions and lack of individual attention students received in
the existing schools and decided to found a school of her own, following her
own educational philosophy. She proposed this idea to others, gained their sup-
port, and through this support acquired the funds, the building, and the other
resources necessary to build the school. Then she opened the school, the one
that this later woman attended and is so thankful for. This was action under
category 1, joint action. Here, as in category 2, we can establish a twofold re-
sponsibility—the greater responsibility goes to the woman whose idea and
initiative began the process, but responsibility (of another kind) also goes to
those who joined with her in supporting her initiative and helping her accom-
plish it.
In considering the different possibilities for how joint action is achieved, a
certain fact becomes apparent. The higher up the list we move, toward cate-
gory 1, the more individuals are involved in freely determining the direction
of activity in these aspects of human life. To the extent that combined actions
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in some sphere of human life are categorized near the beginning of the list,
members of society retain responsibility for freely conceiving, initiating, and
joining in the pursuit of combined activities in this sphere of life. This is partic-
ularly apparent in categories 1 and 2, joint and collective action, respectively.
In those categories action is divided between the act of initiation (which takes
the form of a proposal rather than a command) and the act of joining or choos-
ing to participate in the action taken by those who voluntarily join or contrib-
ute to or otherwise support the proposed combined action.
In joint action, matters are entirely left up to the members of society, acting
freely, to pursue the relevant goods in these areas of human life; no one else
performs or organizes these tasks for them, though they may establish or reg-
ulate the conditions of pursuit. As we move down the list, fewer members of
society are given responsibility for action. To the extent, then, that society
leaves more individual members with the task of conceiving, initiating, and
joining in combined action in this way, the members of society can also be con-
sidered to be responsible for those aspects of human life. To the extent that we
move in the other direction, they are given less and less responsibility, as these
affairs are brought under the authority of some specially appointed group
within society.
The reason social state makes a difference is that under aristocratic social
state some individuals always possessed such responsibility, whereas in dem-
ocratic social state it is not clearly the case that any individuals at all need to
possess responsibility for combined action. This does not say anything about
whether any particular sort of activity ought to be handled through joint ac-
tion or administrative action or anywhere in between. Perhaps, indeed, it is
right that the more of society that is governed by regular bureaucratic processes,
the better; some very able thinkers have thought so. Tocqueville, however, did
not. Why not?Why does it matter if the citizenry is more or less responsible with
respect to important aspects of human life? In particular, how is such responsi-
bility related to the ideal of the free citizen?
This takes us to the second stage of the argument. Let us see whether this
foray into the philosophical thickets can bring us home to the free citizen.
4. A FREE PEOPLE
Let us introduce a second ideal, the ideal of a free people. For now, we’ll treat
it as a provisional ideal; dialectically, we are concernedwith this new ideal only
if it can be properly traced back to the ideal of the free citizen. A “free people”
as we’re here deﬁning the term is a people whose members are responsible for
the most important matters concerning them. In PatchenMarkell’s terms, they
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are not only free from dominating control but also free from usurpation of in-
volvement in public activity (see Markell 2008). As an ideal it may be approx-
imated to various degrees by different peoples at different times according to
the different circumstances that they face. It is quite rare for many members
of a society to be responsible for freely conceiving, freely initiating, and freely
joining activity within these spheres.
Members of a free people, however, not only act freely with regard to their
most private and individual interests but also freely join together for the sake
of securing common goals and interests or achieving objects that lie beyond
the power of an individual to achieve without combined action.
If we accept this ideal of a free people, then, it will matter very much to us to
what degree most members of society are left with the responsibility for com-
bined action in the various important spheres of human life. We will be sensi-
tive to both domination and usurpation, and we will wish to secure the con-
ditions under which as many members of society are capable of engaging in
combined activity as possible and pursuing the tasks of republican statecraft
in a form similar to that conceived of by Tocqueville. The natural question
to ask is, why should we accept the form of freedom embodied in this ideal?
Markell’s argument against Pettit’s republicanism, as just mentioned, fo-
cuses on the difference between domination and usurpation as two different
ways of limiting agency. The problem with slavery is not only the presence
of domination. Markell argues that the injustice of slavery operates along
“multiple dimensions” (2008, 27). If there is an injustice in making the slave
subject to the master’s will, to become the “instrument” of the master’s will
and the performer of his labor, then there is a second injustice in restricting
the slave to involvement in a limited set of activities. In the example of empire,
such injustice appears especially sharply when a benevolent imperial power is
devoted to a mission of human rights, so that although its policies and gover-
nors may track subjects’ interests, its rule still appears unjust.
Markell’s argument draws attention to the possibility that Pettit’s concep-
tion of freedom is rooted in a mistake about what is involved in agency, but the
injustice mentioned is not clearly described. The danger of this mistake about
agency is cashed out in terms of the danger of misunderstanding the agency of
the state; Pettit envisions the state as a kind of servant or slave of the citizens,
and Markell warns, “This view misdescribes the relation of the state to its cit-
izens in much the same way that slaveholders’ ideology misdescribed the rela-
tion of slaves to masters. . . . [The] scandal of the state [under this view] is that
it, too, always turns out to be more than the obediently robotic servant of its
citizens” (2008, 31). Having entrusted all political action to the state, the cit-
izens are liable to become aware, as slaveholders are liable to become aware,
that they are vulnerable to the servant precisely because it has sole command
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of certain spheres of action. As Marx later said in a related context, speaking
of the short-lived French parliamentary republic of 1848–51, of which Tocque-
ville himself was an anxious member, “It required only a thrust of the bay-
onet for the membrane to burst and the monster to leap forth before our eyes”
(1996, 112).
This argument provides a reason why a citizen may wish to retain involve-
ment in political affairs out of fear of later tyrannical misuse of usurped power,
but not why this involvement is itself important. In particular, it still seems un-
clear whether democratic involvement is part of the ideal of the free citizen.
To answer this question, let’s adapt one of Tocqueville’s most well-known
arguments. The young Tocqueville, perhaps remembering Napoleon, still feared
the tyranny of a caesar (Tocqueville 1840/2000, 301; cf. 621); visiting Amer-
ica, Tocqueville came to fear the tyranny of an unrestrained majority (vol. 1,
bk. 2, chaps. 8 and 9); but reﬂection and experience brought Tocqueville ﬁ-
nally to fear a different kind of despotism. The object of Tocqueville’s mature
fear was a state that subjected its citizens to perpetual tutelage, for their own
beneﬁt, and thereby gave them few opportunities for the signiﬁcant use of free-
dom (vol. 2, bk. 4, chaps. 6 and 7; cf. Tocqueville 1856/1998, 131). Having so
few opportunities for engaging in combined action and becoming “pusillani-
mous and soft” (Tocqueville 1840/2000, 672), “they will soon become inca-
pable of exercising the great, unique privilege that remains to them,” that of
choosing representatives, and “one will not make anyone believe that a liberal,
energetic, and wise government can ever issue from the suffrage of a people of
servants” (665). Thus, Tocqueville concludes that democratic statecraft must
take care to attend to democratic character and that the primary means for this
is through the experience of freedom in combined action.
In explaining this ﬁnal despotism he appealed not to the ideal distinction
between slave and free or between aristocrat and peasant but to that between
adults and children (Tocqueville 1840/2000, 663). Children too are unfree,
not by slavery but by tutelage or guardianship. Even when parents exercise au-
thority only in a way that tracks children’s interests and without domination,
children are not signiﬁcantly free. The most important things in their lives are
not up to them, either to decide on or to pursue;10 small children are free only
with respect to the least important matters, such as choice of their amuse-
ments, while older children acquire greater independence, but only regarding
private matters such as friends and directions of study, and not always even
regarding the most important of these. Because children lack responsibility
and are not trusted with matters of importance, the transition from childhood
to adulthood is a signiﬁcant transition toward freedom and the government of
10. Comparison with Taylor (1985) is natural on this point.
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one’s own life. The relationship between adults and children, then, also estab-
lishes an ideal distinction regarding freedom, and the more that some person
or group resembles one pole of the distinction, the more we can regard some-
one as either free, on the one hand, or unfree, on the other.
The distinction between these two groups consists primarily in the indepen-
dence of judgment and action they are entrusted with regarding matters of im-
portance, regardless of whether the control exercised is “dominating” or not
in Pettit’s sense. Thus, we must also say that the ability to judge matters of im-
portance and pursue important goods oneself, rather than being subject to the
judgment of another and receiving goods from another, is itself a mark of free-
dom. It is from this that we can derive the conclusion that a free people will be
one whose members are entrusted with matters of importance, including those
requiring combined action.
Should we agree? Let’s review what has been said. What divides combined
actions falling into the top two categories (joint action and collective action)
from those falling into the lower two (executive or legislative action and ad-
ministrative action) is the degree to which matters of importance can be left to
the people to secure for themselves and to what degree they cannot be trusted
to do so. When these conditions obtain, “public business” is the business of the
members of society, the citizens, themselves. In particular, the citizens are in-
volved in signiﬁcant kinds of action and decision-making, where important mat-
ters are at stake. “Involvement,” so understood, is important principally because
of the importance of the types of activity that are being usurped. This connec-
tion to the importance of the types of activity from which citizens are being ex-
cluded brings us back to the ideal of a free citizen, as someone with grounds
for pride and a spirit of independence. Surely involvement in important affairs
is a ground for such pride and spirit, and so in accord with the ideal of the free
citizen.
But let’s not be too hasty. Whether the people are to be trusted with such
responsibility seems an empirical question, whose answer varies with condi-
tions. Moreover, let us imagine the following challenge: You’ve proffered this
theory of combined action and the new distinction between adults and chil-
dren as grounds for supporting a republican theory of liberty that combines
non-domination with involvement in public affairs. But we need to be more
careful here: haven’t we been awfully free with the ideal of the free citizen?
It is one thing to go on talking loosely about pride, independence, and so
on; it is another to properly conceptualize something into a coherent, differen-
tiated, and developed idea. Before we can say whether both derivations prop-
erly belong to the ideal or not, we ought to make sure we understand the ideal
and specify in what ways these rival conceptualizations derive from it. Then
we will know better whether we are justiﬁed in speaking of a free people, as
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deﬁned above, as a social and political ideal, and of the capacity to freely con-
ceive, initiate, and join in combined action as a form of liberty.
5. THE IDEAL OF THE FREE CITIZEN
At the start of the Revolution . . . the French were proud enough of their cause and of
themselves to believe that they could be equal in freedom. (Tocqueville 1856/1998,
244)
Having returned from our philosophical foray, we can now ask which deriva-
tion of republicanism best accords with the ideal of the free citizen—one em-
bodying Pettit’s philosophy of non-domination, or one based on Tocqueville’s
vision of freedom in combined action?
Central to Pettit’s argument for republicanism is the vivid case he makes for
the value of a liber or free person being able to “look others in the eye,” a
thought expressed in a variety of different forms in his arguments for repub-
lican freedom and embodied in his “eyeball test,” consisting in the ability to
look others in the eye without reason for fear or deference. Pettit’s descriptions
of the power of domination to require those subject to it to “bow or scrape,
toady or kowtow, fawn or ﬂatter” for the sake of pleasing a dominating party
strike the reader as clearly undesirable (2012, 82); or, in Skinner’s words, we
object to the way that “servitude breeds servility” (2008, 213).
The importance Pettit assigns to being able to look others in the eye illus-
trates how the spirit of independence invoked by the appeal to the free citizen
is essentially a kind of reﬂective self-understanding, the citizen’s conception of
himself qua citizen, based on how he is related to others in terms of his social
and political condition. The ideal of the free citizen so understood, then, is
principally an ideal of living in freedom from a kind of degrading relationship
that would cause us to have a different kind of self-conception and create a
different kind of spirit and character. The citizens’ endorsement of this self-
conception both for themselves and for their fellow citizens is what animates
Pettit’s republic: “[Republican] institutions cannot walk on their own. They
are dead, mechanical devices, and will gain life and momentum only if they
win a place in the habits of people’s hearts” (Pettit 1997, 241). They must pos-
sess them as a kind of “civic virtue” or “civility,” as Pettit prefers to put it. Civic
virtue in Pettit’s republic will consist primarily in internalizing the norms of
non-domination and in identiﬁcation with fellow citizens, especially vulnera-
ble groups among them (245).
Turning to Tocqueville’s conception of republicanism and the free citizen,
we raise the following natural questions: Why think that “involvement” mat-
ters? Why care whether a society makes participation in combined action
available or not? Tocqueville sometimes treats the good of freedom as a kind
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of unanalyzable ﬁrst principle, saying that the love of liberty has no basis but a
“sublime” feeling, and that this feeling cannot be explained to any who lack it
(1856/1998, 217). This, however, is Tocqueville’s view of all ﬁrst principles,
about which he tends toward a Pascalian pessimism.11 To properly appreciate
the good of liberty in Tocqueville’s thought, we need to secure a wider context,
which can allow us to understand the value of political liberty and the capacity
to participate in combined action.
The starting point for his argument for the citizen is implicit in the ideal dis-
tinction between adults and children. Although a child may have things to be
proud of, it would be absurd for an adult to regard the same things as grounds
of pride; the kind of activities that a child engages in, compared to those en-
gaged in by an adult, distinguishes the two.We have seen that a citizen belong-
ing to “a free people” will have the capacity to propose, initiate, and join in
combined activity. This means possessing, and understanding oneself to pos-
sess, the capacity to engage in a particular class of activities distinct from that
of combined actions but overlapping with it and related to it in important
ways, a class I here term free actions.
Free actions specify a range of actions with several qualities, in virtue of
which these actions can be classed in terms of degree. The maximum case of
free action (what I elsewhere call greatness-in-action; Jech 2016, 121–30) pro-
vides a good way into the larger class, by drawing free actions’ features in the
most vivid colors. Examples of greatness-in-action include an aristocrat’s ex-
travagant vices (Tocqueville 1840/2000, 936); the making of magniﬁcent tombs
(43); Renaissance painting (795); the American Pilgrims’ founding of a new col-
ony where they would be free to worship (54); the actions of the American states-
man George Washington in the founding and in establishing the direction of
American foreign policy, a greatness most completely expressed in his resistance
to the exaggerations of popular passion (190, 371); and the actions of the revo-
lutionary generation during the ﬁrst stage of the French Revolution (Tocqueville
1856/1998, 244).
Actions included in this class possess three interrelated properties: (1) they
are free, that is, the action is not motivated by material necessity, or at least not
directly necessitated by instinct or by material needs; (2) they possess ideality,
namely, the action originates “in the soul,” that is, in an idea or ideal, an intel-
lectual, moral, or spiritual need; and (3) they requiremastery, that is, the action
requires effort, skill, or power to realize the idea in the world. There isn’t space
here to analyze these actions thoroughly, but a few remarks are necessary.
11. See Tocqueville (1985, 63) for a summary of Tocqueville’s view and Jech (2016) for
an extended treatment of this aspect of Tocqueville’s thought, including a delineation of his
points of disagreement with Pascal.
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The freedom required for greatness-in-action includes not only non-domination
(“the pleasure of being able to speak, act, and breathe without constraint, un-
der the government of God and the laws alone”; Tocqueville 1856/1998, 217)
but also freedom from material need or natural necessity. The construction of
tombs, the production of ﬁne art, and the pursuit of “liberty, equality, and fra-
ternity” do not ﬁll the stomach or clothe the body.
The ideality marking these actions connotes something beyond the ordi-
nary and the everyday: modern painters are exact anatomists, but Renaissance
painters “looked above themselves” for “great subjects”; Raphael “sought
something better than nature” and “gave us a glimpse of divinity in his works”
(Tocqueville 1840/2000, 795). Yet ideality is more wide ranging than simply
goodness, beauty, and truth, as evidenced, for example, in the fact that Tocque-
ville thought that vices could be great and that the Pilgrims’ goal was great with-
out being true. Tocqueville has an expansive and liberal conception of ideal-
ity instead, requiring only that an action pursue an idea or ideal grounded in
thought.12
Finally, none of these actions could be executed without overcoming difﬁ-
culties through a combination of skill and knowledge of the subject of action,
that is, without displaying a mastery of the material environment that allows
the actor or actors to bridge the gap between the realm of thought, where the
idea or ideal arose, and the realm of the body, where this idea is now to be real-
ized and achieved.
Some actions manifest these qualities to a very high degree, such as those
mentioned above. But since the degree to which an action can manifest any
of these three qualities varies, the class of free actions occupies a much larger
space, space that includes actions like founding a school. It is also signiﬁcant
that although some free actions are capable of being carried out by a single in-
dividual acting alone, as in the case of a great artist like Raphael, many free
actions, and perhaps most of them, are also cases of combined action and must
be carried out by many people acting together. Thus, an important aspect of
the freedom to engage in combined action is the freedom to initiate or join
in those free actions that are impossible for someone to perform acting alone.
What is essential to Tocqueville’s conceptualization of republicanism is the
connection he sees between free, combined actions and free citizens. This con-
nection can be traced as follows. Some kinds of free action can be performed
by individuals acting alone, but many, and perhaps most, cannot: their perfor-
12. For further development of this theme of ideality, see Jech (2016), but see also, for
differing views of the same, Lawler (1993a, 1993b) and Kahan (2015); Kahan draws this do-
main in terms of our need for “spiritual balance” (something he has also explored in unpub-
lished work on Tocqueville’s conception of human nature, where he compares “material”
with “non-material desires”), and Lawler in terms of mental “restlessness.”
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mance requires combined action of some kind. Crucially, Tocqueville thinks
that there is something especially essential about collective action, that is, free
political action, in making the other forms possible or, rather, known and rec-
ognized as possible. It is only when these conditions are met that citizens come
to regard themselves as being responsible for such actions. This sense of re-
sponsibility shapes their reﬂective conception of themselves as citizens; it
teaches them that they are the type of beings who engage in free actions, ac-
tions that manifest freedom, thought, and skill.
Finally, because the difference between free actions simply and greatness-
in-action is one of degree, citizens can understand their relation to those who
perform these actions as also being one of degree, not of kind; they know that
they are not essentially cut off from such greatness. Since it is through learning
to handle less important matters that we become ready for the more important
ones, one cannot entrust the unimportant matters to administrative action and
leave just the most important of all to the people: “Subjection in small affairs
manifests itself every day and makes itself felt without distinction by all citi-
zens. It does not make them desperate; but it constantly thwarts them and
brings them to renounce the use of their wills. Thus little by little, it extinguishes
their spirits and enervates their souls. . . . In vain will you charge these same cit-
izens, whom you have rendered so dependent on the central power, with choos-
ing the representatives of this power from time to time” (Tocqueville 1840/2000,
665).
From Tocqueville’s perspective, such a system of government is a great sys-
tem of civic dis-education. The free citizen’s spirit and pride of citizenship con-
sist in identifying himself as the kind of being who can, in principle, engage in
free actions, on the basis of actual experience and practical knowledge of such.
This explains Tocqueville’s bitter opposition to centralized bureaucratic
states, where the most important affairs do not belong to anyone in particular;
these societies show “insufﬁcient conﬁdence in the independence and judgment
of ordinary people” (Mahoney 1993, 188), and as a result, citizens’ self-reﬂection
cannot incorporate responsibility for such affairs. Aristocratic pride consists
in placing responsibility for combined action within a few particular families,
which incorporate its power of achievement into their self-concept; members
of aristocratic societies know that at least some people possess the requisite qual-
ities to take on such tasks.13 Such arrangements, by allowing the state to become
“his master, his tutor, his schoolmaster . . . for fear of letting a man fail” (Tocque-
13. Compare Manent (1996, 68): “By placing certain men in a sublime social position,
the aristocrats set forth a sublime idea of man, and stimulate in some men (who are not nec-
essarily the same as the ﬁrst) sublime efforts. . . . Nothing of the kind takes place in democ-
racies, where nature is left to itself, and where it therefore runs the risk of falling short of its
potential.”
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ville 1968, 183), throw individuals back on themselves and divorce them from a
context in which they could participate in signiﬁcant free actions, so that they
“[fall] gradually below the level of humanity” (Tocqueville 1840/2000, 1259).
Democratic pride requires diffusing this capacity to engage in combined action
widely among all citizens, which requires widespread potential for individuals
freely coming together in action.
So which version of republicanism best answers the appeal to the ideal of
the free citizen? Pettit considers the free citizen in republican thought to be
someone “who [lives] within his own domain . . . on terms that he himself
[sets]” (2012, 17). According to this vision, each member of society occupies
a “domain” that we can characterize as the space within which that member
exercises freedom and makes choices. Pettit primarily emphasizes the fact that
within this domain the citizen acts without needing to rely on anyone’s plea-
sure or approval (freedom from domination), and gives secondary emphasis to
the “size” of this domain (the range of choices over which one enjoys such free-
dom; see Pettit 1997, 76; 2012, 26–27).
Regarding these features, Tocqueville’s and Pettit’s conceptions of the free
citizen overlap. Tocqueville appeals to “the pleasure of being able to speak, act,
and breathe without constraint, under the government of God and the laws
alone” (1856/1998, 217). Thus, his free citizen too is marked by the possession
of a domain in which he acts without needing anyone’s pleasure or approval.
Freedom to initiate and join in combined action is difﬁcult to reconcile with
domination.
There is a signiﬁcant difference between how the two corresponding philos-
ophies conceptualize the ideal of the free citizen, however. Pettit is sensitive to
two features of the citizen’s domain but omits a third, extremely relevant fea-
ture: the importance of the objects lying within the citizen’s domain. It is not
enough to expand the range of choices available to someone, if the most im-
portant matters remain up to someone else, even if these matters are decided
on in a non-dominating fashion. But many of the most important objects are
obtainable only through combined action, and this is precisely what freedom
of initiation is designed to guarantee for the ideal free citizen—the freedom to
conceive, initiate, and pursue objects lying beyond the power of a single indi-
vidual to attain, rather than by a power such as the state. The value contained
in the ideal of the free citizen is, for Tocqueville, based in the value of the cit-
izens being suited to responsibility for important aspects of human life, and
their democratic pride is based in their knowledge that they are ﬁt for this re-
sponsibility and identifying these aspects and activities as in some sense “their
own” (see Jech 2013). Such citizens, closed to their greatest possibilities, fall into
the danger of becoming Nietzsche’s “herd” or Kierkegaard’s “the crowd”: en-
forcers of uniformity and mediocrity.
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Pettit’s theory as stated doesn’t seem to leave any room for evaluating ac-
tion in terms of anything that would suitably ﬁll the same role, and his version
of the citizen seems to lack an important range of grounds for pride that the
citizen possesses in Tocqueville’s derivation. This is all the more striking be-
cause in his other work, Pettit has provided ample theoretical resources for ar-
ticulating what is at stake here in a way that would avoid many liberal worries
over making republicanism dependent on an overly substantive view of the hu-
man good: these resources are in his theory of group agency. We cannot ex-
plore this theory here, but in outline, Pettit could treat freedom of combined
action as a kind of freedom with respect to group agency, where what hangs
in the balance is whether citizens possess the freedom to initiate the creation
of, or to join, “group agents” (see List and Pettit 2011). Such group agents al-
low their members to pool resources in a rational and coordinated way in or-
der to accomplish tasks that these members could not achieve individually.
Had he taken this route, his republicanism might have provided an extremely
valuable and precise articulation of what is involved in combined action. Since
he did not do this, however, we must admit that the two derivations diverge in
how they appeal to the ideal of the free citizen.
Now, we might raise the following objections: Are the activities that require
freedom of combined actions really so important? Do they really provide such
signiﬁcant grounds for the pride of the citizen? To this, the Tocquevillian can
make the following response: The neo-Roman republicans’ attention to history
ought to have taught the lesson the Persians were forced to learn from the
10,000 Greek mercenaries whose generals they had kidnapped, whose lower
ofﬁcers they had murdered, but whose ability to freely govern themselves they
could not wipe out. Isolated in the heart of Persia, 10,000 Greeks elected new
generals, and, despite all that was arrayed against them, 6,000 successfully
marched out from the Persian Empire to return safely to Hellas. Their success
is attributable not only to their ease with democratic procedures but also to their
understanding of themselves, their sense of the kind of tasks that they could suc-
cessfully take on. And isn’t this, quite simply, the free citizen we are seeking—
the free citizen whose spirit and pride in citizenship are matched by his sense of
what he can accomplish with others?
Now, we should be careful. We shouldn’t make too much of a single exam-
ple, as if such marvels are automatically entailed by the habit of combined ac-
tion, but it is proﬁtable to consider the point. To the extent that it is right,
Pettit’s free citizen lacks important grounds for pride and democratic spirit
that the Tocquevillian citizen possesses, for the latter understands that the kinds
of important projects that require group agents are in principle open to him and
those for which he might become responsible, and his self-conception will in-
clude the belief that he is, after all, the kind of person who might pursue these
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tasks. This is the reality that the ideal distinction between adults and children
invokes. The adult has an intellectual maturity and level of skilled competence
that is translated into responsibility for actions that require intelligence, fore-
sight, and skill—a responsibility not given to children.
In light of this, we can imagine a further Tocquevillian argument. Accord-
ing to Pettit, the citizen’s sense of self-worth is social in character and based on
the fact that he need not show deference to anyone. He is an equal among
peers and is therefore able to look his fellow citizens in the eye (Pettit 2012,
83). But we can imagine the following Tocquevillian rejoinder: to have pride
in one’s status as citizen is comical if one is restricted from responsibility for
the most important matters, which are left to the charge of impersonal market
forces, powerful government agents, or the state’s bureaucratic apparatus; there
is a comic contradiction in asserting pride while admitting that one lacks even
potential responsibility for anything important. To the extent that a state lacks
freedom for joint and collective action, its citizens will lack the possibility of
responsibility of this kind. But if the citizen never touches the greatest human
objects and, what is more, knows that such objects are not his to touch, then
what sort of ideal citizen have we fashioned? A people that internalizes the prin-
ciple that “individuals do small things and the state immense ones” will pro-
duce citizens with no ground for such pride (Tocqueville 1840/2000, 674).With-
out a positive element, the ideal falls ﬂat.
If we are attracted to the ideal of the free citizen, then, we should hesitate to
accept contemporary conceptualizations of such that include only non-domination.
There are good grounds for thinking that Tocqueville’s derivation of republi-
canism is more faithful to the ideal of the free citizen than one that conceptual-
izes this only in terms of non-domination; it provides positive grounds for pride
and spirit that are not merely social and relative and that concern the power
of republican social and political institutions to give us a more accurate grasp of
our powers and potential. There is a great difference between a free citizen com-
fortable with responsibility for important matters and someone who, like a val-
orized associate professor who lacks any share in university governance, is
merely safe and well administered. The ideal of the free citizen republicanism
contains both a negative and a positive element, which the latter of these accounts
leaves out.
Republicans should therefore consider the task of thinking through how
such freedom can be conceptualized and instantiated in the contemporary con-
text, if indeed we think that we and our fellows can be such citizens. Tocque-
ville provides evidence that republicanism can combine liberal, egalitarian, and
participatory elements, and if his derivation is more faithful to the ideal that
makes republicanism attractive in the ﬁrst place, we ought to be attentive to
it. However, Pettit’s work should not be jettisoned. Rather, we ought to make
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greater use of it. Both his analysis of non-domination and that of group agency
can and should be utilized and developed by future republicans, in order to pro-
vide a ﬁrmer analytical conceptualization of republican ideas; his work has the
potential for providing a more precise understanding of its nature and value
than has hitherto been available. Such a project, which developed republican-
ism in accordance with Tocqueville’s vision but using the types of tools provided
by Pettit, could perhaps not only bring Athens and Rome together in peace but
also join their hands in a truly fruitful union.
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